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ABSTRACT
To overcome a market of ‘lemons’, online auction marketplaces must be able to differentiate among products and generate
price premiums for high-quality ones. Still, the literature has only focused on seller quality uncertainty (seller reputation),
alas ignoring the role of product quality uncertainty, which is defined as the degree by which the outcome of the transaction
cannot be accurately predicted due to fears that product quality may differ from what is expected. This is especially
problematic for used products where product quality uncertainty is often greater. To overcome adverse product selection, this
study first introduces four product-related variables (inspection, warranty, value, and attributes) that impact price premiums,
and it also proposes their interaction effect with seller reputation. The proposed model will be tested with secondary data
from used cars on eBay Motors. Implications for mitigating product quality uncertainty and preventing a market of ‘lemons’
are discussed.
Keywords:
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INTRODUCTION
The physical separation between buyers and sellers in online auction marketplaces, such as eBay, creates major uncertainties
for buyers since they cannot physically inspect and evaluate the products they purchase.  Whereas buyers in physical markets
can evaluate a product’s quality by “kicking the tires,” online buyers must evaluate product quality through the web interface.
Product quality uncertainty is defined as the degree by which the outcome of the transaction cannot be accurately predicted
due to fears that product quality may differ from what is expected. Product quality uncertainty makes it difficult for buyers to
select high-quality products due to information asymmetry (Kirmani and Rao, 2000), thereby raising the possibility for
adverse product selection.
Price premiums for superior products are essential for the survival and success of online auction marketplaces since lack of
product differentiation would force high-quality products to flee the marketplace as their quality could not be rewarded, thus
resulting in a market of ‘lemons’ (Akerlof, 1970). Hence, product quality uncertainty and adverse product selection can have
a fatal impact on online auction marketplaces if products cannot be differentiated to result in price premiums for superior
ones. Therefore, this study first examines the negative impact of product quality uncertainty on price premiums.
Despite concerns for adverse product selection, the literature on online auction marketplaces has predominantly focused on
seller quality uncertainty, focusing on understanding how seller reputation (primarily from superior feedback scores) results
in buyer’s trust and price premiums (e.g., Ba and Pavlou, 2002; Dellarocas, 2003; Pavlou and Gefen, 2005). In contrast,
research on understanding and mitigating product quality uncertainty is scarce. The literature has examined the perceptual
construct of perceived product diagnosticity (Jiang and Benbasat 2004), described as the extent to which a buyer believes that
a website is helpful in terms of evaluating a product. However, research that specifically focuses on overcoming adverse
product selection through objective product quality signals is still at its infancy. Therefore, the study’s second objective is to
understand how product-related factors, specifically product inspection, product warranties, product value, product
characteristics (e.g., product price, year, and used car mileage) can act as signals that convey useful product information, and
in doing so, to reduce product quality uncertainty and prevent adverse product selection. Third, this study aims to understand
the interaction between seller and product quality uncertainty, aiming to examine how seller reputation through feedback
ratings interrelates with the proposed product related-factors to predict price premiums. We propose product quality
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uncertainty to be more problematic when dealing with low quality sellers that may intentionally misrepresent the product’s
conditions through false signals to get higher prices. Finally, while the literature has mostly examined on new and
inexpensive commodity items, this study aims to study used and expensive specialty products (used cars).
The proposed research framework (Figure 1) represents a comprehensive set of seller and product related factors and how
their interactions predict price premiums (controlling for auction related factors). The proposed model will be tested with
secondary data from used cars on eBay Motors.
Figure 1. The Proposed Research Framework
The study’s primary contribution is to introduce product quality uncertainty as an important antecedent of price premiums,
aiming to show that overcoming adverse product selection through product information can have a positive effect on a
product’s price premium (accounting for seller feedback scores and controlling auction characteristics).
CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT
Price Premiums
Price premiums are defined as the result of high prices that lead to above-average profit for the same product (Shapiro, 1983).
Applied to online auction marketplaces, price premium is defined as the monetary amount above the average price received
by multiple sellers that sell a perfectly duplicate product during a finite period (Ba and Pavlou, 2002). As mentioned above,
price premiums represent an important element to the survival and success of online auction marketplaces, and they are
herein proposed as this study’s ultimate dependent variable.
In this study, since all used cars are unique, it is not possible to obtain the price premium by using the average price. Instead,
we match each used vehicle sold on eBay with the corresponding market value for a car with the exact same characteristics
(year, mileage, options) given by Edmunds (www.edmunds.com).1 The standardized difference from the market value is the
price premium.
1 Edmunds provides an estimated value of used cars given some standard characteristics (model, year, mileage, options);
however, the car’s true condition and actual quality cannot be evaluated through Edmunds.
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Product Quality Uncertainty
All transactions have a certain degree of uncertainty about their outcome, and buyers cannot accurately predict whether a
transaction will be fulfilled successfully. In buyer-seller relationships, quality uncertainty is defined as the degree to which
the outcome of a transaction cannot be accurately predicted by the buyer due to the seller- and product-related factors.
Uncertainty consists of seller quality uncertainty (seller hiding its true attributes, making false promises, or defrauding), and
product quality uncertainty, the degree by which the outcome of a transaction cannot be accurately predicted by the buyer.
Following the adverse selection problem (Akerlof, 1970), product quality uncertainty arises due to hidden information
regarding the true quality of a seller’s products, given that product information is asymmetrically distributed between buyers
and sellers. Information asymmetry has been recognized as a common (hidden information) problem in buyer-seller
relationships in which sellers usually possess more information than buyers (Mishra et al., 1998). This brings buyers in a
disadvantaged position as they are faced with a pool of products with potentially undesirable characteristics. In other words,
buyers cannot easily discriminate the “cherries” (high quality products) from the “lemons” (low quality products).
Product quality uncertainty has a negative effect in online auction marketplaces. Dewan and Hsu (2004) showed that buyers
give a 10-15 % adverse selection discount on their prices for stamps on eBay’s auctions compared to traditional auctions.
Accordingly, Wolf and Muhanna (2005) concluded that online car auctions lead to adverse selection problems, and thereby
lower prices compared to traditional used car prices.  In their analysis of used cars, Garicano and Kaplan (2001) showed that
adverse selection problems in online auctions are similar to traditional car auctions, which were deemed to be pervasive.
Product quality uncertainty and adverse product selection are thus important problems with implications for price premiums.
What Reduces Product Quality Uncertainty?
Buyers can reduce product quality uncertainty and prevent adverse product selection by obtaining accurate information about
a product’s true quality. One of the most prominent means to reduce the hidden information problem is through signals.2
Signals are designed and sent by sellers to disclose the private information about their true quality of their products. In turn,
buyers examine these signals to assess their value, content, and credibility in order to assess a product’s true characteristics.
A set of signals is herein proposed to reduce product quality uncertainty:
Product Inspection
Product inspection by an independent third party is a signal that conveys credible information about a product’s true quality.
In doing so, it reduces product quality uncertainty and helps buyers select high-quality products. Moreover, in a related study,
Emons and Sheldon (2002) examined inspection records of used vehicles and found that the vehicles sold by private parties
(which were not required to be inspected) were more likely to have defects than vehicles sold by dealers who were required
to submit an inspection report. Recognizing that higher quality vehicles are likely to be inspected, buyers would feel less
uncertain about car’s true quality if the product is independently inspected,3 and they would be more likely to pay a premium.
Product Warranty
Product warranty is a tangible pledge by the seller that the product will adhere to some posted specifications. For example,
used cars are often sold with warranties against defects or promises to repair any problems. Product warranty is a signal that
the product is of high-quality, and also an incentive for the seller to sell a high-quality product to prevent returns or repairs.
Viewing this signal, buyers would perceive the product as less uncertain, and thereby be willing to offer a price premium.
Product Value
The higher the product’s expected value, the higher the degree of uncertainty given the monetary loss assumed by the buyer.
Therefore, more expensive products are likely to be viewed as more uncertain, and thereby receive a price discount.
Product Attributes
The product’s inherent characteristics can be viewed as signals that reveal a product’s hidden information. Avery et al. (1999)
showed the more information is available, the less the uncertainty about the product’s true quality is. For example, important
characteristics about a used car include year built and mileage. Older cars with many miles can be viewed as more uncertain
since their true condition cannot be easily assessed. Therefore, they are likely to receive a price discount.
2 In theory, effective signals must be credible, visible, unambiguous, and differentially costly to allow high-quality products
to differentiate from low-quality ones.
3 Since the inspector is selected by the seller, we expect an interaction effect between seller reputation and product inspection.
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Seller Quality Uncertainty and Price Premiums
The literature on online auction marketplaces has emphasized seller quality uncertainty, focusing on how seller reputation
(primarily from numerical feedback ratings) results in buyer’s trust and price premiums (e.g., Ba and Pavlou, 2002;
Dellarocas, 2003; Pavlou and Gefen, 2005). Recent studies have also found a significant association between a seller’s
positive and negative feedback ratings and auction prices (Dewan and Hsu, 2004; Wolf and Muhanna, 2005). Therefore,
seller feedback ratings are expected to predict price premiums.
Interaction Effects between Product and Seller Characteristics
Product and seller quality uncertainty are inter-related constructs since sellers have the opportunity to misrepresent the true
quality of their products or deliver products that differ from their posted description. Therefore, we examine the interaction
effects between product and seller characteristics. In the literature, Genesove (1993) examined adverse selection in the used
car market by comparing used cars auctioned by new car dealers (who sell both new and used cars) with car dealers of only
used cars. In this setting, new car dealers sell a much greater percentage of their used cars (regardless of product quality) than
used car dealers, who are more likely to retain and retail better quality trade-ins. Consistent with adverse selection theory,
Genesove finds that seller reputation affects used car prices, showing that new car dealers (who are perceived as more
reputable) receive higher prices than used car dealers (who are perceived as more uncertain) for equivalent cars. Accordingly,
Avery et al. (1999) showed that reputable sellers did not need to disclose as much information about their products compared
to less reputable sellers who had to disclose more information to reduce the product quality uncertainty.
Control Variables
In addition to product and seller characteristics (and their interaction effects), auction characteristics may also have an impact
on price premiums. Therefore, we control for the number of auction bids, the existence of reserve prices, the auction’s
duration, and whether the auction is advertised as a featured auction.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The proposed model will be tested with secondary data from over 300,000 completed auctions of used cars on eBay Motors.
Using advanced text mining tools, we collected multiple data from completed auctions, including highest winning bids,
seller’s feedback scores (positive and negative ratings), reserve prices, auction duration, number of bids, featured auction,
among others. Most important, we collected detailed information about the advertised used car, including product inspection,
warranties, and product characteristics (year, mileage, model, VIN, options, location, color, etc.). This information enabled us
to match each used vehicle to its corresponding market value, as provided by Edmunds (www.edmunds.com). In doing so,
we were able to obtain a comparable price premium value for all used cars, enabling us to make comparisons across products.
In terms of differences in geographic location, since virtually all used cars are shipped across the United States for a
comparable fee ($500), shipping costs for all products in our sample is considered to be a constant.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to obtain price premiums for used products. Previous research has used
brand new items to calculate price premiums by subtracting the product’s highest winning bid from the average price from
multiple perfectly duplicate new products (e.g., Ba and Pavlou, 2002). However, this calculation is impossible for used cars
that are all unique and not perfectly duplicate. Therefore, obtaining and matching each used car’s detailed characteristics with
Edmunds’ market value data for used cars allows us to obtain a comparable price premium value for each car. Moreover,
whereas previous research has used a small number of completed auctions (e.g., Wolf and Muhanna, 2005), this study will
use data from over 300,000 completed auctions, thereby allowing a much higher power of econometric analysis.
Specifically, the proposed model will be tested with econometric analysis, using the following equation:
PP=ao + b0*INSP + b1*WARR + b2*VAL + b3*YEAR + b4*MIL + b5*S_POS + b6*S_NEG + b7*CONTROLS + o
Where:  PP: Price Premium (Highest Winning Bid – Edmunds obtained market value for exact used product)
INSP: Product Inspection (whether product was inspected by independent third-party inspector)
WARR: Product Warranty (whether product carries a warranty)
VAL: Product Value (Edmunds obtained market value for exact used product)
YEAR: Year Used Car was manufactured
MIL: Used Car Mileage
POS/NEG: Seller’s Positive and Negative Feedback Ratings
CONTROLS: Control Variables (Auction Bids, Reserve Price, Auction Duration, Featured Auction)
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Moreover, we will examine a multivariate regression model with the interaction effects between the product’s characteristics
(e.g., inspection, warranty, and value) with the seller’s characteristics (positive and negative feedback ratings).
The data analysis and results of these econometric models will be available for presentation at AMCIS.
CONCLUSION
To prevent a market of ‘lemons’, online auction marketplaces must not only differentiate among sellers, but they must also
differentiate among products and reward high-quality ones with price premiums. Failure to differentiate between high-quality
and low-quality products will force high-quality products to exit, resulting in a market of only low-quality products.
Therefore, product quality uncertainty and adverse product selection are fundamental issues for online auction marketplaces,
and any means for differentiating among products has implications for the survival and success of online marketplaces.
Following the logic of signals, we propose four product-related variables (inspection, warranty, value, and attributes) that
influence price premiums (accounting for seller quality characteristics). Moreover, we propose that product and seller
interaction effects are likely to have an impact on price premiums (controlling for auction characteristics).
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